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CALIFORNIA'S UNCONSTITUTIONAL PUNISHMENT FOR
HEINOUS CRIMES: CHENICAL CASTRATION OF
SEXUAL OFFENDERS
Raymond A. Lombardo
INTRODUCrION
On September 17, 1996, Governor Pete Wilson signed legislation
(the "California Statute") making California the first state to require
that paroled recidivist sex offenders receive chemical injections that
will suppress their sex drives.' This injection, of the drug known as
Depo-Provera 2 is popularly called "chemical castration."13
The law that Governor Wilson signed, applicable to sex offenses
such as sodomy, rape, and child molestation,4 altered section 645 of
the California Penal Code by making chemical castration mandatory
for repeat paroled sex offenders.5 The prior law had left it within the
discretion of the judge to offer Depo-Provera as a choice of punish-
ment to a paroled repeat offender.6 Under the new law, the judge
retains discretion to offer the drug to first time offenders.7
1. See Cal. Penal Code § 645 (West Supp. 1997); Dave Lesher, Molester Castra-
tion Measure Signed, L.A. Tmes, Sept. 18, 1996, at A3. The prior version of section
645 gave courts discretion to direct that an operation be performed upon the defend-
ant for the prevention of procreation where the victim was a female under the age of
10. Cal. Penal Code § 645 (1988). The prior statute applied to men and women guilty
of specified sexual offenses, and generated very little case law. In People v. Blanken-
ship, 61 P.2d 352 (Cal. Ct. App. 1936), the court affirmed the sterilization of a defend-
ant for raping a 13-year-old and possibly infecting her with syphilis. The courtjustified the defendant's sterilization not only on the grounds that he raped the girl,
but also because of the threat that he could infect other members of society with
syphilis. Id at 353. The legislation signed by Governor Wilson repeals the above pro-
vision and instead provides that any person convicted once of a specified sex offense
where the victim is under 13 may be punished with Depo-Provera upon parole, in
addition to any other punishments prescribed by law. Cal. Penal Code § 645 (West
Supp. 1997). Upon a second conviction, the law specifies mandatory imposition of
Depo-Provera injections, unless the offender consents to surgical castration. Id.
2. The trade name of Depo-Provera is medroxyprogesterone acetate treatment.
See Edward A. Fitzgerald, Chemical Castration: MPA Treatment of the Sexual Of-
fender, 18 Am. J. Crim. L. 1, 2 (1991).
3. Id. at 3.
4. The revised version of section 645 applies to men and women who violate the
following provisions of the California Penal Code: (1) section 286(c) or (d) (sodomy
with a person under 14, either alone or in concert, and more than 10 years younger
than the defendant, or when force is used); (2) section 288(b)(1) (lewd or lascivious
acts with a child under 14, by violence, threat of violence, etc.); (3) section 288a(b) or
(d) (acts of oral copulation with a person under 18, either by force or when the victim
is unable to consent); (4) section 289(a) or (j) (penetration of genital or anal openings
by foreign or unknown objects of a person under 14 and more than 10 years younger
than the defendant). Cal Penal Code § 645 (West Supp. 1997).
5. Id.
6. Cal. Penal Code § 645 (West 1988).
7. Cal. Penal Code § 645 (West Supp. 1997).
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This Note argues that chemical castration, as provided for in the
California Statute, is an unconstitutional punishment because it vio-
lates the aspirational principles against inhumane treatment embodied
in the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause.8
Part I discusses Depo-Provera's effectiveness in reducing sexual recid-
ivism and outlines the controversy surrounding the studies conducted
with Depo-Provera. Part II considers the threshold issue of whether
the California Statute is punishment or treatment. This determination
is necessary in anticipation of the state's defense of the statute on the
grounds that it mandates treatment, rather than punishment, and
hence is not susceptible to Eighth Amendment scrutiny. After sug-
gesting that the statute is, in fact, punishment, part II illuminates a
central issue of constitutional adjudication-the question of when ju-
dicial deference to legislative action is appropriate. Whether defer-
ence is appropriate reflects the general issue of how courts are to
interpret the Constitution generally, and the Eighth Amendment spe-
cifically. In light of these questions, part II outlines the various ap-
proaches to Eighth Amendment interpretation and the implications of
these approaches on the issue of judicial deference to an enactment
like the California Statute.9 Part III draws upon the interpretational
theories outlined in part II to argue that a standard of cruelty based
on aspirational principles is most consistent with both the Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Clause and the role of a judge in a constitutional
democracy.
Anticipating that some jurists may not accept an aspirationalist
view, part IV examines the California Statute in light of risk of error
analysis, which is needed to temper the analysis of legal rules. Part IV
first explains that consideration of error is an indispensable element of
the analysis of legal rules. Although a judge may properly conclude
that a certain legal rule, if always applied properly, may not infringe
on constitutionally protected rights, risk of error analysis forces that
judge to consider the consequences, in practice, of imperfect applica-
tions of legal rules and contemplate the possibility that such imperfect
application may infringe on core values. Employing risk of error anal-
ysis thus allows the judge to correctly prioritize values in light of the
potential for mistake in the application of legal rules and reach a re-
sult consistent with all of society's values. Therefore, this Note con-
cludes that the California Statute violate the Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Clause's proscription against inhumane treatment. By re-
quiring this punishment, California has unwisely balanced the value of
8. The Eighth Amendment reads, "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor ex-
cessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. Const.
amend. VIII.
9. One of the commentators with the most thoughtful insights on the tension
between judicial review and democratic government is the late Professor Bickel. See
Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar
of Politics (1962).
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punishment against the potential consequences to individual liberty if
punishment is improperly applied. Moreover, precedent and tradition
require the state to do exactly the opposite. Thus, this Note argues
that the courts should find the California Statute invalid.
I. BACKGROUND
Depo-Provera, a relatively new treatment for sexual offenders is
both controversial and misunderstood. To clarify the ambiguity sur-
rounding Depo-Provera, as well as its effects and its success rate in
reducing sexual recidivism, this part describes how Depo-Provera
works, and then delineates the recognized classes of sexual offenders,
outlining the effects of Depo-Provera upon each class of offender.
This part also highlights criticisms of the use of Depo-Provera to con-
trol paroled sexual offenders. These criticisms will be recalled later to
demonstrate that the California Statute is likely to be ineffective, and
ultimately, unconstitutional.
A. What Is Depo-Provera?
Depo-Provera is a synthetic progesterone approved by the FDA for
use in women as a contraceptive.10 When used in men, it works to
reduce sex drive by inhibiting the release of follicle-stimulating and
luteinizing hormones from the anterior pituitary gland.' Limiting the
release of these two hormones reduces the amount of testosterone
produced by the testicles. 12 The net effect is a reduction of both the
amount of testosterone in the bloodstream and the aggression that it
produces.'3 Depo-Provera also increases the metabolism of testoster-
one by the body, accordingly lowering its presence in the body. 4 In
effect, then, Depo-Provera "burns the candle from both ends" by si-
multaneously limiting the production of testosterone and decreasing
10. Progesterones are a class of female hormones. For a general description of
Depo-Provera, see Physician's Desk Reference 2079-81 (51st ed. 1997) [hereinafter
PDR]; Fitzgerald, supra note 2, at 2 n.7.
11. Fred S. Berlin, Sex Offenders: A Biomedical Perspective and a Status Report
on Biomedical Treatment, in The Sexual Aggressor 83, 106-11 (Joanne G. Greer &
Irving R. Stuart eds., 1983) (describing the biological effects of Depo-Provera); Fitz-
gerald, supra note 2, at 6; Paul A. Walker et al., Antiandrogenic Treatment of the
Paraphilias, in Guidelines for the Use of Psychotropic Drugs 427, 432-33 (Harvey C.
Stancer et al. eds., 1984).
12. See Berlin, supra note 11, at 107 (noting the decrease in sperm count after
Depo-Provera was administered); Fitzgerald, supra note 2, at 6; Pamela K. Hicks,
Castration of Sexual Offenders: Legal and Ethical Issues, 14 J. Legal Med. 641, 646
(1993); Don Riesenberg, Motivations Studied and Treatment Devised in Attempt to
Change Rapists' Behavior, 257 JAMA 899, 900 (1987); Walker, supra note 11, at 432-
33.
13. Berlin, supra note 11, at 106; Fitzgerald, supra note 2, at 6; Riesenberg, supra
note 12, at 900; Walker, supra note 11, at 432-33.
14. Walker, supra note 11, at 433 (Depo-Provera lowers testosterone to
prepubertal levels); Berlin, supra note 11, at 106-07 (explaining proper dosage levels).
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its prevalence in the bloodstream. Not all of the effects of progester-
ones are positive, however. Synthetic progesterones like Depo-
Provera may also produce considerable side effects, including changes
in blood pressure, changes in body chemistry, weight gain, decrease in
sperm count, changing insulin levels, fatigue, testicular atrophy, diabe-
tes mellitus, and cancer in laboratory animals. 15
B. A Partial Success Story: Treatment of Paraphiliacs
Studies show that Depo-Provera, when administered in conjunction
with psychological counseling, is a somewhat effective treatment for a
class of sexual offenders known as paraphiliacs.' 6 Paraphiliacs are
those persons suffering from paraphilias, disorders characterized by
hormonal compulsion to commit sexually deviant behavior in order to
realize a specific and particularized sexual fantasy. 17 The first experi-
mental use of Depo-Provera as treatment for paraphiliacs was con-
ducted at Johns Hopkins University during the 1960s, 18 and showed
definite promise in rehabilitating offenders "where none formerly
existed."' 9
In the typical Depo-Provera research protocol, doctors use compre-
hensive psychological testing to correctly identify paraphiliac test sub-
jects.20 Comprehensive testing is needed because the mere
commission of a sexual offense does not indicate the nature of the
offender's psychological problem;2' such acts may be motivated by a
number of different causes.' As a result, the offender's cognitive,
emotional, and behavioral states must be analyzed in order to cor-
rectly distinguish a paraphiliac offender from other types of offenders
15. Berlin, supra note 11, at 107; Fitzgerald, supra note 2, at 7; PDR, supra note
10, at 2081-82.
16. Walker, supra note 11, at 436-37; Fitzgerald, supra note 2, at 8-9. Professor
Fitzgerald reached his conclusions after examining studies of the effects of Depo-
Provera on sex offenders. In contrast to those who will receive the injections under
the California Statute, however, the patients Fitzgerald described consented to Depo-
Provera treatment.
17. The American Psychiatric Association has defined paraphilias as "recurrent,
intense sexually arousing fantasies, sexual urges, or behaviors generally involving 1)
nonhuman objects, 2) the suffering or humiliation of oneself or one's partner, or 3)
children or other nonconsenting persons, that occur over a period of at least 6
months." American Psychiatric Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders 522-23 (4th ed. rev. 1994).
18. William Green, Depo-Provera, Castration, and the Probation of Rape Offend-
ers: Statutory and Constitutional Issues, 12 U. Dayton L. Rev. 1, 5 (1986); John
Money, Use of an Androgen-Depleting Hormone in the Treatment of Male Sex Offend-
ers, 6 J. Sex. Res. 165 (1970).
19. Money, supra note 18, at 172.
20. Fred S. Berlin & Carl F. Meinecke, Treatment of Sex Offenders with Antian-
drogenic Medication: Conceptualization, Review of Treatment Modalities, and Prelimi-
nary Findings, 138 Am. J. Psychiatry 601, 601-02 (1981) (explaining the nature and
diagnosis of paraphilias); Berlin, supra note 11, at 86-88 (same).
21. See supra note 20.
22. Fitzgerald, supra note 2, at 5.
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who will not benefit from Depo-Provera.3 The paraphiliac's mental
state is characterized by a persistent fantasy about sex, and his emo-
tional state is captivated by an erotic fixation which can only be real-
ized through enactment of the particular fantasy.2' Once doctors
perform a comprehensive medical examination to ensure that the of-
fenders are not be susceptible to any medical complications, they usu-
ally administer the participants weekly injections of Depo-Provera.2
Because many sexual dysfunctions are not only physical, but also
psychological, consent to treatment is important because the function
of Depo-Provera is to increase the threshold barrier for sexual
arousal, leaving the paraphiliac offender better able to experience a
psychological reorientation from counseling.26 Although the drug
treatment facilitates effective psychological counseling by relieving
the offender of the constant desire to satisfy his sexual urgings, ulti-
mately the offenders must also want to be treated to cure the psycho-
logical component of sexual dysfunction. 7 Thus, to be effective,
Depo-Provera and counseling must be jointly administered to the
paraphiliac offender.
C. Criticisms of Depo-Provera
It should also be noted, however, that medical, scientific, and legal
commentators have criticized such use of Depo-Provera. 2 As dis-
cussed above, in studies of paraphiliacs, the administration of Depo-
Provera in conjunction with counseling has reduced recidivism.29 But
many commentators have noted that research design flaws taint both
chemical and surgical castration studies.30 The use of castration in the
23. Id.; see also Berlin, supra note 11, at 83-88 (outlining the symptoms of various
sexual disorders and the importance of correct diagnosis).
24. Fitzgerald, supra note 2, at 5; Walker, supra note 11, at 429.
25. Jonathan R. Kelly & James L. Cavanaugh, Jr., Treatment of the Sexually Dan-
gerous Patient, 21 Current Psychiatric Therapies 101, 103-04 (1982); Walker, supra
note 11, at 433.
26. Fitzgerald, supra note 2, at 9; Green, supra note 18, at 5-6.
27. Walker, supra note 11, at 433; Fitzgerald, supra note 2, at 9.
28. The California Psychiatric Association opposes the California Statute because
it believes offenders will not be helped by Depo-Provera when it is administered ab-
sent counseling and a willingness to take the drug. See Sex Offenders: Chemical Cas-
tration, AB 3339, Cal. Senate Rules Comm. 8 (1996) [hereinafter Senate Rules
Committee Hearings]; Green, supra note 18, at 6-8; Hicks, supra note 12, at 665-66;
Kari A. Vanderzyl, Comment Castration as an Alternative to Incarceration: An Impo-
tent Approach to the Punishment of Sex Offenders, 15 N. Ill U. L Rev. 107, 128
(1994); see also Castration or Incarceration? 151 New Scientist 3 (1996) [hereinafter
Castration or Incarceration?] (citing criticism of the proposition that a drug can, by
itself, end sexual dysfunction); Philip Cohen, California Castration Law 'Ill-Judged,
151 New Scientist 4 (1996).
29. Hicks, supra note 12, at 647.
30. Green, supra note 18, at 7. Surgical castration research has been criticized
because it has neither been verified by controlled group studies, nor studied on rap-
ists, who comprise a major portion of sexually violent felons. Asher R. Pacht, The
Rapist in Treatment Professional Myths and Psychological Realities, in Sexual Assault
1997] 2615
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treatment of sexual disorders is based primarily on case reports and
single experimental designs, not on controlled group studies.31 Fur-
thermore, some critics do not accept the underlying premise of the
studies done with Depo-Provera-namely that these offenders are
motivated by hormonal impulse.32 Due to the above mentioned
shortcomings, these commentators question Depo-Provera's
effectiveness.33
Another criticism commentators raise is that Depo-Provera's effec-
tiveness has not been studied on other classes of sexual offenders, pri-
marily out of recognition that different sex crimes have different
motivations.' There are four recognized classes of sexual offenders,"
of which paraphiliacs are only one type, called Type IV class offend-
ers. 36 In contrast to paraphiliacs, Type I sexual offenders deny the
commission of the crime or the criminal nature of the act.37 Type II
sexual offenders confess to the crime, but place the blame on non-
sexual forces such as drugs or stress. 8 Type III sexual offenders are
motivated by non-sexual emotions, such as anger or power.39 Due to
the varying causes of sexual dysfunction many commentators do not
believe that deviant behavior can be controlled with a drug, because
these offenders' motivations are often not hormonal but
psychological.40
Thus, although Depo-Provera has shown promise in treating
paraphiliac offenders when used as part of a comprehensive therapeu-
tic program, most experts agree that any approach, such as Califor-
90, 92-93 (Marcia J. Walker & Stanley L. Brodsky, eds. 1976); Castration or Incarcera-
tion?, supra note 28, at 3.
31. See supra note 30 (describing shortcomings of surgical and chemical castration
research designs).
32. See Senate Rules Committee Hearings, supra note 28, at 8; Hicks, supra note
12, at 665; Shari Roan, No Consensus on Chemical Castration, L.A. Times, Sept. 26,
1996, at El, E5; Rhonda L. Rundle, Will 'Chemical Castration' Really Work?, Wall St.
J., Sept., 19, 1996, at Bi; Abigail Trafford, Castration Complexities, Wash. Post, Oct.
15, 1996, (Health Magazine) at 6.
33. Hicks, supra note 12, at 665-66 (discussing criticism of the idea that sexual
dysfunction can be fully explained by hormone irregularity and not other psychologi-
cal factors); Roan, supra note 32, at E5; Rundle, supra note 32, at B1; Trafford, supra
note 32, at 6.
34. Cohen, supra note 28, at 4; Hicks, supra note 12, at 665 (explaining that some
medical commentators believe that sex crimes are motivated by factors such as anger
and hatred); Roan, supra note 32, at E5.
35. Walker, supra note 11, at 429; Fitzgerald, supra note 2, at 4; Kimberly A. Pe-
ters, Chemical Castration: An Alternative to Incarceration, 31 Duq. L. Rev. 307, 312
(1993).
36. Walker, supra note 11, at 429; Fitzgerald, supra note 2, at 4; Peters, supra note
35, at 312.
37. Walker, supra note 11, at 429; Fitzgerald, supra note 2, at 4.
38. Walker, supra note 11, at 429; Peters, supra note 35, at 312.
39. Walker, supra note 11, at 429.
40. Cohen, supra note 28, at 4; Hicks, supra note 12, at 665; Castration or Incarcer-
ation?, supra note 28, at 3; Roan, supra note 32, at E5.
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nia's, that does not properly identify and counsel the paraphiliac, will
not be effective.4 1 The fact that the regimen in question has so little
chance of being effective also suggests that punishment, and not treat-
ment, may be the law's goal. The next part undertakes the inquiry of
whether the law is punishment, and thus whether Eighth Amendment
analysis is appropriate.
II. FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS
As discussed above, much of the scientific literature speaks of
Depo-Provera in the context of treating, rather than necessarily pun-
ishing, sex offenders. This highlights an important threshold inquiry in
Eighth Amendment analysis: whether chemical castration should be
considered punishment or treatment.42 This part establishes that the
California Statute is designed to be a punitive measure. After demon-
strafing that the California Statute is punitive, and hence that Eighth
Amendment analysis is appropriate, this part outlines competing con-
stitutional theories and the implications of these theories on Eighth
Amendment interpretation.
A. California's Depo-Provera Regimen: Punishment or Treatment?
Because Depo-Provera has been the subject of many experimental
treatment protocols for sex offenders, any Eighth Amendment chal-
lenge to the California Statute could conceivably be rebuked by the
contention that the purpose of the statute is to offer treatment, and
therefore that the law is not properly subject to Eighth Amendment
scrutiny. As a result, any attempt to defeat the argument that the pur-
pose of the California Statute is treatment rather than punishment
must undertake the difficult task of determining legislative intent.
Fortunately, one case has distilled the factors that courts examine
when making a determination of whether a regimen constitutes pun-
ishment or treatment. After applying the test articulated by this court
and concluding that the California Statute qualifies as a punishment,
this section examines two other factors-the intention of the drafter,
and the location of the law in the penal code-as dispositive indicators
that the purpose of the California Statute is to punish, not to treat.
41. See supra notes 20-27 and accompanying text.
42. Green, supra note 18, at 20 (applying Eighth Amendment analysis to proba-
tionary conditions such as chemical castration); Peters, supra note 35, at 318-21 (ex-
plaining that the states' punishment power with respect to chemical castration is
subject to the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause); Dennis H. Rainear, The Use of
Depo-Provera for Treating Male Sex Offenders: A Review of the Constitutional and
Medical Issues, 16 U. Tol. L. Rev. 181, 207-15 (1984) (performing Eighth Amendment
analysis on chemical castration regimen); Elizabeth Symonds, Mental Patients' Rights
to Refuse Drugs: Involuntary Medication as Cruel and Unusual Punishment, 7 Has-
tings Cost. L. Q. 701,703-04 (1980) (performing Eighth Amendment analysis on the
use of psychotropic drugs).
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In Rennie v. Klein,43 a federal district court in New Jersey had to
determine whether the forced administration of anti-psychotic drugs
to an inmate of a mental institution constituted punishment or treat-
ment to decide whether the inmate brought a valid Eighth Amend-
ment claim." To answer the question whether the inmate's regimen
was punishment or treatment, the court distilled from prior case law
four factors useful in determining whether a legislative prescription is
retributive or rehabilitative: (1) Does the procedure have therapeutic
value?; (2) Is its use recognized as accepted medical practice?; (3) Is
it part of an ongoing psychotherapeutic program?; and (4) Even
though it may have long term benefits, are the side effects unreasona-
bly harsh?45 Applying these factors to the California Statute leads to
the conclusion that the law is punitive.
Depo-Provera fails with respect to the first factor, the therapeutic
value of the treatment. The therapeutic effectiveness of Depo-
Provera is debatable. While the drug has shown promise when admin-
istered to paraphiliac offenders as part of a comprehensive treatment
program, the drug has not been shown to be effective when forcibly
administered to non-paraphiliac offenders outside of a comprehensive
treatment program.46 Some commentators even question the validity
of the studies done with paraphiliacs because of defects in research
design.47
As to the second factor, whether the procedure is recognized as ac-
cepted medical practice, Depo-Provera fails again. The proposition
upon which chemical castration rests, that sexual dysfunction can be
cured purely via hormonal suppression, is not widely accepted in the
medical community.48 Indeed, a great deal of argument persists in the
medical community as to the causes of sexual dysfunction, and no con-
43. 462 F. Supp. 1131 (D.NJ. 1978); Green, supra note 18, at 20-21. The Rennie
Court, in distilling its own test, summarized the factors that other courts have ex-
amined to determine whether the law in question is punishment or treatment. The
court found that most courts look to various factors such as whether the practice is
part of a continuing and medically supervised treatment program. The court looked
to the following cases to make this determination: Knecht v. Gillman, 488 F.2d 1136,
1138 (8th Cir. 1973) (looking to whether the drug is effective and accepted medical
practice); Mackey v. Procunier, 477 F.2d 877, 878 (9th Cir. 1973) (finding that proof of
forced administration of drug to accompany shock therapy could "raise serious consti-
tutional questions respecting cruel and unusual punishment"); Pena v. New York
State Division for Youth, 419 F. Supp. 203, 211 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (inquiring whether
administration of drug was part of ongoing psychotherapeutic program); and Nelson
v. Heyne, 355 F. Supp. 451, 455 (N.D. Ind. 1972) (stating that administration of tran-
quilizing drugs should not be considered therapy because it was not part of a continu-
ing treatment program). Rennie, 462 F. Supp. at 1143.
44. Rennie, 462 F. Supp. at 1143.
45. Id
46. See supra notes 20-27 and accompanying text.
47. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
48. See Iicks, supra note 12, at 665 (citing medical criticism of the idea that sexual
dysfunction is motivated purely by hormonal and not psychological problems).
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sensus has been reached that synthetic progesterones curb such dys-
functions.4 9 There is also considerable debate in the medical
community over the adverse health consequences of Depo-Provera.50
While Depo-Provera has been approved by the FDA for use as a
method of birth control for women, there is no research on the long-
term adverse health consequences of the drug.51 Such information is
needed because the drug did cause severe, adverse health conse-
quences in laboratory testing.' These facts support the claim that the
use of Depo-Provera to effectuate castration is not an accepted
practice.
Because the California Statute does not prescribe the use of the
drug as part of an ongoing psychotherapeutic program, the California
Statute does not satisfy the third factor.53 It is clear that the injections
are not part of an ongoing therapeutic treatment program. Rather,
the use of Depo-Provera is mandated for repeat offenders, regardless
of the particular offender's characteristics and motivations. 5  This is
so even though Depo-Provera has been proven successful only in
treatment of paraphiliac offenders when administered as part of a
comprehensive treatment program. 55 If California desired that these
offenders receive treatment, the state would have followed the Depo-
Provera research protocols, and limited the Depo-Provera application
to paraphiliac offenders engaged in a counseling program.56 That the
state disregarded the elements of the experimental treatment pro-
grams like the one conducted at Johns Hopkins suggests that the state
is not interested in treating offenders, but rather in punishing them.57
The final Rennie factor examines whether the treatment protocol at
issue will deliver the offender tangible rehabilitative benefits as com-
pared to its adverse side effects.58 Even paraphiliac offenders do not
49. Hicks, supra note 12, at 665; see supra note 32-33 and accompanying text.
50. Green, supra note 18, at 14-15 (noting that long-term use of Depo-Provera is
suspected to cause cancer); John T. Melela et al., Legal and Ethical Issues in the Use
of Antiandrogens in Treating Sex Offenders, 17 Bull. Am. Acad. Psychiatry L 223,225
(1989).
51. Green, supra note 18, at 14-15; Roan, supra note 32, at E5; Rundle, supra note
32, at B7; Richard Stone, Controversial Contraceptive Wins Approval from FDA
Panel, 256 SoL 1754 (1992).
52. Green, supra note 18, at 14-15; Melella, supra note 50, at 225.
53. Cal. Penal Code § 645 (West Supp. 1997). Assemblyman Hoge, the drafter of
the Depo-Provera measure, used the research of Dr. Berlin, the author of several
papers on Depo-Provera, to justify his call for chemical castration of repeat sexual
offenders. Dr. Berlin, however, is against the use of Depo-Provera when its adminis-
tration is not voluntary and accompanied by counseling. Se Offenses: Chemical Cas-
tration, AB 3339, Cal. Senate Comm. on Crim. Procedure 5-6 (1996).
54. See Cal. Penal Code § 645 (West Supp. 1997).
55. See supra notes 16-19 and accompanying text.
56. See supra notes 20-25 (outlining typical Depo-Provera research protocols).
57. See supra notes 16-19.
58. See Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131, 1143 (D.NJ. 1978).
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benefit from the regimen that California prescribes;59 indeed the only
rational benefit that could be perceived to flow from the statute is its
retributive effect. Instead of offering rehabilitative benefits, Depo-
Provera causes considerable adverse side effects.6" While the FDA
approved the drug for a short-term use for female birth control, con-
troversy persists over the drug's adverse long-term effects, such as dia-
betes, insulin fluctuations, testicular atrophy, sperm deformities, and
cancer, that would manifest themselves if the drug is used for the ex-
tended periods required to effectively castrate a man.61 These poten-
tially serious adverse health effects on the offender as compared to the
virtually nonexistent therapeutic value indicate that the California
Statute is retributive.
In addition to the California Statute's failure to satisfy any of the
four Rennie factors, even the statute's legislative history reveals that it
was intended to be a punitive measure. The statute's author made
clear that one of the law's primary purposes was to specifically define
those sex crimes that would be eligible for the penalty of chemical
castration.62 Moreover, the law's placement in the penal code, as a
replacement punishment for surgical castration for certain sex crimes,
also indicates that the drafters intended the law to be retributive. 63
The above factors strongly suggest that the California Statute is not
an experimental treatment program, but rather is a punitive mea-
sure.64 Accordingly, its provisions are susceptible to Eighth Amend-
ment analysis. This analysis is difficult, however, because there are
competing theories of constitutional interpretation in general, and
Eighth Amendment interpretation in particular, that complicate the
consideration of the statute's constitutionality. This Note now turns
to the leading theories of Eighth Amendment interpretation and some
of the prominent proponents of these theories, and attempts to dis-
cern the competing interpretive options in the hope of choosing the
best one for evaluating chemical castration under the California
Statute.
59. See supra part I.C (arguing that the involuntary use of Depo-Provera absent
counseling is unlikely to be effective).
60. Melella, supra note 50, at 225; Stone, supra note 51, at 1754.
61. Green, supra note 18, at 14-15 (arguing that the long term use of the drug
would be suspect as a valid condition of probation because it could lead to cancer);
Stone, supra note 51, at 1754.
62. See Senate Rules Committee Hearings, supra note 28, at 7.
63. See Cal. Penal Code § 645 (referencing the sexual offenses to which § 645 is
applicable); 1996 CA AB 3339 (stating that the chemical castration provision repeals
the surgical castration requirement and is to be used in its place).
64. This Note does not consider the constitutionality of using Depo-Provera under
proper medical supervision as part of an ongoing consensual treatment program;
rather it focuses solely on the drug's application under the system created by the
California Statute, which does not contemplate ongoing consensual therapeutic
treatment.
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B. Different Approaches to Eighth Amendment Interpretation
1. Introduction: How Does the Eighth Amendment
Limit Punishment?
Courts have categorized five types of limitations that the Eighth
Amendment 65 places on punishments:' (1) means of punishment;67
(2) proportionality;68 (3) power to criminalize;69 (4) conditions of
confinement;70 and (5) procedural due process. 71 For the purposes of
determining its constitutionality, chemical castration falls into the
means of punishment category.' Means of punishment analysis asks
the question: "Is it constitutional for the government to impose pun-
ishment X for any crime? '73
2. Disagreements over the Clause's Meaning
Currently, there is no dominant judicial theory of Eighth Amend-
ment interpretation. 74 The variety of views on the Clause's meaning
has precluded consensus on an appropriate standard of review, and
65. The Supreme Court has held the Eighth Amendment to be applicable to the
states via incorporation through the Fourteenth Amendment. See Robinson v. Cali-
fornia, 370 U.S. 660, 666-67 (1962).
66. See Margaret J. Radin, The Jurisprudence of Death: Evolving Standards for
the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, 126 U. Pa. L. Rev. 989 (1978) (applying
categories in the capital punishment context). Professor Denno updated these cate-
gories to reflect current developments in Eighth Amendment case law. See Deborah
W. Denno, Getting to Death: Are Executions Constitutional?, 82 Iowa L Rev. (forth-
coming January 1997).
67. See, e.g., Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349,382 (1910) (proscribing cadena
temporal, the Philippine punishment of binding the hands and ankles in chains, fol-
lowed by the loss of basic civil rights).
68. See, e.g., Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 976-86 (1991) (discussing
whether the Eighth Amendment contains a proportionality requirement).
69. See, e.g., Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962) (holding it unconsti-
tutional to penalize a person because he is a drug addict).
70. See, e.g., Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1992) (beatings by prison
guards permissible to limited extent).
71. See e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 241 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring)
(stating that "the requirements of due process ban cruel and unusual punishment").
72. The issue is whether the state can impose chemical castration as a legal condi-
tion of parole, irrespective of whether such a condition is proportional to the crime
committed. Chemical castration may well be invalid as a disproportionate punish-
ment. Such a discussion, however, is beyond the scope of this Note.
73. Radin, supra note 66, at 993.
74. See id. at 1002 (suggesting that in cruel and unusual punishment cases, "confu-
sion about the appropriate adjudicatory attitude has prevailed"); John C. Shawde,
Jurisprudential Confusion in Eighth Amendment Analysis, 38 U. Miami L Rev. 357,
372 (1984) (noting the failure of Supreme Court Justices to agree on a justification for
the death penalty cases); Richard L. Slowinski, South Carolina v. Gathers: Prohibit-
ing the Use of Victim-Related Information in Capital Punishment Proceedings, 40 Cath.
U. L. Rev. 215, 249 (1990) (citing persistent disagreement in Eighth Amendment
interpretation).
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the cases reflect this disagreement.75 In Furman v. Georgia,76 a case
involving the constitutionality of Georgia's capital punishment statute,
the Supreme Court handed down nine separate opinions.7 7 Practi-
cally, this means that the only time the Supreme Court agrees that a
punishment is unconstitutionally cruel is when the punishment is one
of the core cases of cruelty known to the Framers. Absent the pres-
ence of a quintessential example of cruelty-such as disemboweling
alive, public dissection, burning at the stake, quartering, or physical
castration-the Court has argued over the definition of cruelty.78 The
general source of this difficulty is a familiar one in constitutional adju-
dication. On the one hand, the legislative enactment represents the
will of the people, which is not to be disregarded lightly in a democ-
racy.79 On the other hand, the law in question may violate the Consti-
tution, which must be protected from the encroachments of the
ordinary law."°
75. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, Powell
and Stevens, JJ.) (articulating procedural rationale for the death penalty); Jurek v.
Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976) (plurality opinion); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S.
280 (1976) (requiring concurrence of Justices Brennan and Marshall to obtain five
vote majority); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976) (same).
76. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
77. Furman, 408 U.S. at 240-42 (Douglas, J., concurring) (asserting that the death
penalty is cruel and unusual because it is meted out in a discriminatory fashion); id. at
257 (Brennan, J., concurring) (arguing that that the death penalty is substantively
cruel in principle); id. at 306, 310 (Stewart, J., concurring) (stating that the death pen-
alty is cruel because it is "wantonly and so freakishly imposed"); id. at 311, 312
(White, J., concurring) (arguing that capital punishment is cruel because it no longer
serves any "discernible social or public purposes"); id. at 314 (Marshall, J., concur-
ring) (asserting that capital punishment is cruel because it is morally unacceptable to
the people, it fails as a deterrent, and lesser forms of retribution are adequate); id. at
375 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that capital punishment is constitutional be-
cause it was acceptable to the Framers of the Amendment and is consistent with evo-
lutionary standards of decency as evidenced by legislative sanction); id. at 405, 413
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (stating that the death penalty, while repugnant personally,
is not in itself unconstitutional); id. at 414 (Powell, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
Constitution itself and society's standards of decency, as evidenced by legislative en-
actments, opinion polls, etc., demonstrate the death penalty to be constitutional); id.
at 465 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (stating that death penalty is constitutional because
it has been thought necessary by the nation's legislatures since the time of the nation's
founding); see also Radin, supra note 66, at 998 (calling Furman a "jurisprudential
debacle").
78. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 377 (1910) (identifying quintessential
examples of cruelty); Radin, supra note 66, at 1001-02 (describing disagreement over
means of Eighth Amendment interpretation); Shawde, supra note 74, at 370-72
(same); Slowinski, supra note 74, at 249 (noting disagreements over Eighth Amend-
ment interpretation in the area of victim information in capital punishment
proceedings).
79. See James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Con-
stitutional Law, in Legal Essays 9-12 (1908) (arguing for deference to the democratic
process).
80. The problem of judicial annulment of legislative enactments has been called
the "countermajoritarian difficulty" by one commentator. See Bickel, supra note 9, at
16. Professor Bickel justified judicial review on the basis that the courts were protect-
[Vol. 652622
1997] CALIFORNIA CASTRATION 2623
Justices have responded differently to the interpretational challenge
posed by the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause. Resolution of
the question of whether a punishment is cruel will rest upon the Jus-
tices' interpretation of the Clause."' For example, if the Clause is read
to prohibit only historically cruel punishments, then deference should
be given to the legislative judgment unless it sanctions a punishment
considered historically cruel.' 2 If the Clause is given an evolutionary
reading, then the legislative judgment should be accorded deference
when the evolutionary meaning of the Clause is not violated.s In
considering chemical castration, then, only after the meaning of the
Clause is determined can an evaluation of the constitutionality of the
California Statute can be made.
3. The Interpretive Options
Interpreting the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause poses a fa-
miliar two level problem.84 On the first level is the question of
whether to read evolutionary intent into the Constitution. Some theo-
rists believe that fidelity to the Constitution requires following histori-
cal practices (the "Originalists").as Others argue that the Constitution
must be read in an evolutionary fashion that protects individual liber-
ties (the "Evolutionists")."6 The second level of the problem is that if,
ing the people's fundamental law, the law that governs their political life, Le., the
Constitution, from the ill considered encroachments of the ordinary legislative enact-
ment. When courts invalidated such enactments, they were acting to protect the peo-
ple's fundamental law, and as a result not acting contrary to democratic rule. Id.; see
also Federalist No. 78, at 467 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
[hereinafter Federalist No. 78] (elaborating on the role of courts in defending the
Constitution from legislation that contravenes it).
81. See Bickel, supra note 9, at 16 (stating that a Justice's opinion may be in-
dependent of popular will).
82. See, eg., Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 977 (1991) (Scalia, J.) (using
historical analysis to argue that the language of the Eighth Amendment does not em-
body a proportionality requirement).
83. See infra note 86 and accompanying text (giving a sample of those commenta-
tors who have argued for evolutionary reading of the Constitution).
84. Radin, supra note 66, at 1030.
85. See generally Robert Bork, The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction
of the Law (1990) (critiquing those scholars who read the Constitution in an evolu-
tionary fashion as revisionists who manipulate the text to suit political ends); Antonin
Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law 37-47 (1997) [herein-
after Scalia, Interpretation] (arguing for the originalist position because it is the only
position compatible with popular rule and constitutional democracy); Antonin Scalia,
Originalisnv The Lesser Evil, 57 U. Cin. L. Rev. 849 (1989) [hereinafter Scalia,
Originalism] (admitting that while the originalist position is flawed, its flaws are less
striking than any of the other methods of constitutional exegesis).
86. The following is a sample, by no means exhaustive, of those commentators
who have argued for reading evolutionary intent into the Constitution: Bickel, supra
note 9; Ronald Dworkin, Life's Dominion: An Argument About Abortion, Euthana-
sia, and Individual Freedom (1993); John H. Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory
of Judicial Review (1980); Cass R. Sunstein, The Partial Constitution (1993); Charles
L. Black, Jr., On Reading and Using the Ninth Amendment, in Power and Policy in
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in interpreting the Constitution, one believes that evolutionary intent
is to be read into the Clause, from what source does one derive such
content? 87
a. The Originalists
Some current Justices rely on the force of history when interpreting
the Constitution. In the context of Eighth Amendment interpretation,
these Justices, such as Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia, and Jus-
tice Thomas, would argue that the Court's role is to disallow only
those punishments that were historically contemplated as cruel.88
Under this view, courts have a limited and deferential role, and may
overrule a legislative enactment only if it sanctions a punishment
clearly considered barbaric at the time of the framing. 9 Punishments
fitting this description-such as disemboweling, public dissection, and
the like-are rare.
b. The Evolutionists
In contrast, some Justices, such as Justices Brennan, Marshall, and
Powell, believe that evolutionary intent should be read into the Con-
Quest of Law: Essays in Honor of Eugene Victor Rostow 187 (Myres S. McDougal &
W. Michael Reisman eds., 1985); James E. Fleming, Constructing the Substantive Con-
stitution, 72 Tex. L. Rev. 211 (1993); Lawrence Lessig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 Tex.
L. Rev. 1165 (1993); and Laurence H. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-
Based Constitutional Theories, 89 Yale LJ. 1063 (1980).
87. Each of the writers who favor examining evolutionary intent would fill the
open provisions of the Constitution with meaning based upon their respective theo-
ries. For example, Professor Thayer would argue that the Constitution sets up a sys-
tem of democracy akin to England's. Thus, democratic outcomes should generally not
be disturbed. Thayer, supra note 79, at 9. Professor Dworkin argues that the Consti-
tution's open provisions must be filled with our aspirational principles, and those prin-
ciples are discovered via good argument. For an explanation of discovering
aspirational principles via good argument, see Dworkin, supra note 86, at 145-46.
Professor Ely would fill in the open provisions of the Constitution by making the
courts the guardians of democratic procedure. Ely, supra note 86, at 73-74. Professor
Sunstein would fill in the open provisions of the text with liberal republicanism, or
"deliberative democracy." Sunstein, supra note 86, at 123.
88. Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 18 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing
that traditionally the Eighth Amendment only applied to punishments given out by
judges, not inhumane prison conditions); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 968-73
(1991) (Scalia, J.) (using historical analysis to argue that the cruel and unusual lan-
guage referred to punishments considered barbaric and inhumane, such as drawing
and quartering, burning, disemboweling alive, etc.); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238,
465 (1972) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing for judicial deference towards a "pen-
alty [the death penalty] that our Nation's legislators have thought necessary since our
country was founded"); see also Scalia, Originalism, supra note 85, at 862 (arguing
that the evolutionary intention of the words of the Eighth Amendment is "far from
clear; and I know no historical evidence for that meaning").
89. Furman, 408 U.S. at 465 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that the death
penalty is constitutional based upon its historical acceptance); Radin, supra note 66, at
1012-13.
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stitution.90 These Justices diverge, however, on the proper source of
the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause's content. Proponents
such as Justice Powell read contemporary standards of decency into
the language of the Clause as expressed by statutes, public opinion
polls, and other indicia of public sentiment.91 This approach, also
known as a positive approach, keeps the Clause consonant with soci-
ety's current conception of cruelty, a goal that proponents of this view
would argue is sought by the Clause's vague language.
The approach of Justices Brennan and Marshall, on the other
hand-also known as a normative approach-attempts to identify an
underlying societal consensus, 92 to discern whether, if fully informed
as to both the purposes and drawbacks of the penalty, society would
find the penalty unacceptable.93 The normative approach requires the
judge to discover society's underlying aspirational values and then ap-
ply those values to a given punishment to ascertain whether it is
cruel.94 This approach also keeps the Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Clause in tune with society's current values, but does so by looking to
the underlying aspirational principles embodied in the Constitution.95
90. Furman, 408 U.S. at 263-68 (Brennan, J., concurring) (arguing that the
Clause's indefiniteness is intentional, and designed to limit the legislature's power to
inflict punishment); id at 329 (Marshall, J., concurring) (arguing that the most impor-
tant principle in the Clause is that it must have evolutionary meaning); Coker v.
Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 603 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (defining "evolving standards of decency" via legislative actions and jury behav-
ior in capital cases). Many scholars also endorse this view. See, eg., Bickel, supra
note 9, at 106-10 (arguing for the judicial vindication of individual liberties); Dworkin
supra note 86, at 118-47 (defending an aspirational reading of the Constitution that
vindicates fundamental liberties); Sunstein, supra note 86, at 1-39. 347-54 (advocating
judicial enforcement of liberal republican values). For a critique of commentators,
who, like Professor Bickel, favor evolutionary meaning, see Bork, supra note 85, at
187-93, 213-14 (discussing the proponents of evolutionary intent as "revisionists" who
alter the meaning of the Constitution to suit political ends), and Ely, supra note 86, at
43-72 (criticizing those who believe that judges should protect substantive liberties
instead of acting as guardians of procedural fairness).
91. Coker, 433 U.S. at 603 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(stating that decency must be defined by indicators like legislative enactments and
jury sentencing behavior); Furman, 408 U.S. at 385-86 (Burger, CJ., dissenting) (rely-
ing on indicators like public opinion polls and legislative enactments to determine
constitutionality).
92. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 271-79 (Brennan, J., concurring) (suggesting the
Eighth Amendment prohibits punishments that are degrading to human dignity, in-
flicted arbitrarily, unacceptable to modem society, or excessive); id at 360-69 (Mar-
shall, J., concurring) (determining the extent to which there is an underlying
consensus regarding capital punishment); Radin, supra note 66, at 1039 (explaining
that Justice Marshall has attempted to discern the public's deeply held beliefs about a
particular punishment when analyzing it under the Eighth Amendment).
93. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 232 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
94. See, e.g., Furman, 408 U.S. at 341-42 (Marshall, J., concurring) (attempting to
discern underlying consensus regarding capital punishment); Dworkin, supra note 86,
at 135-38.
95. Furman, 408 U.S. at 270 (Brennan, J., concurring); Dworkin, supra note 86, at
135-38.
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Because this reading looks to underlying aspirational principles, it is
aptly titled the aspirational approach.
The imprecise language of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Clause therefore defies easy explanation and challenges judges to fill
its vague contours with content that is consistent with both the lan-
guage of the Clause and with the institutional role of the courts. The
next section presents a reading of the Clause that is consistent with
the imprecise language of the Clause and with the institutional role
that the Constitution contemplated for the judiciary.
III. A SUBSTANTIVE STANDARD OF EIGHTH AMENDMENT
INTERPRETATION
As demonstrated above, the Constitution in general, and the Eighth
Amendment in particular, offer judges many interpretational options.
This part argues that the approach advocated by Justices Brennan and
Marshall is most consistent with the meaning of the Cruel and Unu-
sual Punishment Clause. The argument is divided into two sections.
The first explains why the aspirational approach advanced by Justices
Brennan and Marshall is the best way to interpret the Cruel and Unu-
sual Punishment Clause. The second section applies the jurisprudence
of Justices Brennan and Marshall to chemical castration, demonstrat-
ing why the California Statute violates the Eighth Amendment's Cruel
and Unusual Punishment Clause.
A. Arguments for Evolutionary Meaning of the Clause
As stated above in Part II, two levels of analysis are required in
order to determine the substantive content of the Eighth Amend-
ment.96 The first level is whether the Clause is to be read with evolu-
tionary intent;97 in the event the answer is yes, the second level seeks
to identify the source of that evolutionary intent.98 This section ar-
gues that the Clause should be read to encompass evolutionary intent,
and that this evolutionary intent should be derived from the "evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society."
To support the contention that the Clause should be interpreted with
evolutionary intent, this section argues that the aspirational reading is
most consistent with both the text and the institutional role of the
judge in a constitutional democracy. This section finally provides
democratic justification for the aspirational reading.
96. See supra notes 84-87 and accompanying text.
97. See supra part II.B.3.
98. See supra part II.B.3.b.
99. Trop v. Dules, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
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1. The Language of the Clause Refutes the Notion of
a Fixed Meaning
The open language of the Clause indicates that the Framers desired
it to be read flexibly so as to evolve over time.co One can argue that
the Framers intended to ban cruelty as that term was specifically un-
derstood at the time of ratification. But as Professor Dworkin has
argued, to phrase the Clause as they did was an imprecise way to sim-
ply ban those penalties that the Framers thought cruel.101 The Fram-
ers knew how to be precise, as exemplified by other provisions of the
constitutional text listing specific requirements. For example, the
Sixth Amendment lists the exact requirements the Framers thought
necessary for a fair criminal trial.'02 The Framers could have been
similarly specific in the Eighth Amendment. Professor Dworkin ar-
gues that the Framers' use of more capacious language indicates that
the Clause is open not only to encompassing those punishments that
the Framers thought cruel, but also those punishments that violate
evolving conceptions of cruelty.10 3 If the Framers wanted to proscribe
a specific list of punishments, they could have done so.3 4 Courts have
100. For a more general discussion of how the open provisions of the Constitution
should be read, and the textual justification for such a reading, see, for example,
Dworkin, supra note 86, at 132-44 (arguing that the text should be interpreted as a
framework of aspirational principles). See also Sunstein, supra note 86, at 93-104 (in-
terpreting the Constitution as embodying liberal republican values); Black, supra note
86, at 187 (using the Ninth Amendment as a rule of construction to justify the protec-
tion of unenumerated rights).
101. Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 135-36 (1977).
102. The Sixth Amendment states:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime
shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascer-
tained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation;
to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process
for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel
for his defence.
U.S. Const. amend. VI.
103. Dworkin, supra note 86, at 135-36; Radin, supra note 66, at 1031-32.
104. In Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (1991), Justice Scalia argued that the
Eighth Amendment contains no proportionality guarantee because the language of
the Clause does not bear such a construction. Justice Scalia claimed that "cruel and
unusual" was not the way that the Framers would have stated a proportionality princi-
ple because it was too vague. If the Framers had wanted proportionality, Justice
Scalia contended, they would have said so explicitly. To support his contention that
the Framers did not use language carelessly, he gives the example of Thomas Jeffer-
son's introduction in the Virginia legislature of a proposal entitled a "Bill to Propor-
tion Punishments" that was intended to make punishments proportional. Id. at 977.
Thus, if the Framers had wanted a proportionality requirement, the Framers knew
how to so specify, and would not have used such imprecise language. Although the
question of whether the Eighth Amendment contains a strict proportionality guaran-
tee is outside the consideration of this Note, Justice Scalia's analysis can be used to
show that the Clause should not be interpreted as a static list of cruel punishments.
Rather, as Justice Scalia points out, the Framers knew how to express what they
wanted precisely. If they had wanted to confine cruel and unusual punishments to
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recognized the validity of this argument, and this understanding is evi-
denced by the fact that they must sometimes reject punishments that
were historically acceptable so as to remain faithful to the Constitu-
tion. 115 This is not to say that the Eighth Amendment does not pre-
clude the administration of punishments that the Framers thought
unacceptable, but rather that the language of the Clause is not ex-
hausted by those practices considered cruel in the late 1700s.106 It is
entirely appropriate, therefore, to widen the inquiry into whether
chemical castration is cruel beyond the historical meaning of
cruelty.
10 7
The more natural reading of the Clause indicates that rather than
intending to proscribe a limited set of punishments considered cruel in
their own time, the Framers instead desired to proscribe cruelty as a
general principle'108 -- to proscribe whatever society would deem cruel
at a particular stage in American history. 0 9 Thus, cruelty is not only
confined to those specific practices that the Framers found offensive,
but also consists of aspirational principles capable of application to
future circumstances. 01 Thus, fidelity to the text may require courts
go beyond historical practices. Justice McKenna stated this proposi-
tion eloquently in Weems v. United States:"
Legislation, both statutory and constitutional, is enacted, it is true,
from an experience of evils, but its general language should not,
therefore, be necessarily confined to the form that evil had thereto-
fore taken. Time works changes, brings into existence new condi-
tions and purposes. Therefore a principle to be vital must be
those specific practices that they considered cruel, they would have provided corre-
spondingly more specific and precise language to express that intention. Their use of
the capacious language forbidding "cruel and unusual" punishments, however, sup-
ports the contention that the Framers intended that the Clause be given evolutionary
meaning. Thus, the Clause should be read to allow future generations to determine
what punishments they consider cruel and unusual. This view of the Eighth Amend-
ment leaves it vital and applicable to changing times. See Dworkin, supra note 101, at
136 (stating that the Clause's appeal to moral concepts cannot be fixed and must
remain open to changing interpretations).
105. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 670-71 n.39 (1977) (suggesting that ear
cropping, acceptable at the time of the Founding, would now be unacceptable); Jack-
son v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 578-79 (8th Cir. 1968) (tradition of using strap as discipli-
nary device on inmates was not determinative of whether it is cruel for Eighth
Amendment purposes); Dworkin, supra note 86, at 135-38.
106. Dworkin, supra note 86, at 132-44.
107. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 86, at 93-104, 107-10.
108. Dworkin, supra note 86, at 135-38; Radin, supra note 66, at 1032; see also Sun-
stein, supra note 86, at 97 (citing the negative effects that the Originalist reading
would have on fundamental liberties).
109. Bickel, supra note 9, at 106-07 (arguing against interpreting the Constitution
with the specific intent of the Framers); Dworkin, supra note 86, at 136-37; Radin,
supra note 66, at 1032. For an example of criticism of this approach to Eighth
Amendment interpretation, see Scalia, Interpretation, supra note 85, at 39-41, 144-49.
110. See Bickel, supra note 9, at 106-08; Dworkin, supra note 86, at 135-36; Radin,
supra note 66, at 1032.
111. 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
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capable of wider application than the mischief which gave it birth.
This is particularly true of constitutions.... They are, to use the
words of Chief Justice Marshall, 'designed to approach immortality
as nearly as human institutions can approach it.'. . .Under any other
rule a constitution would indeed be as easy of application as it
would be deficient in efficacy and power... [and] [r]ights declared
in words might be lost in reality."?
The text of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, then, con-
templates incorporation of contemporary standards of decency. This
evolutionary reading, based on underlying aspirational principles, is
often criticized, however, on the basis that it is anti-democratic. Crit-
ics charge that an evolving constitution, and the active judiciary that
results, has two detrimental effects on democratic government. The
first critique is that an active judiciary constantly places new limita-
tions upon democratic government," 3 thus becoming an institutional
obstacle to self rule and societal change." 4 The second related criti-
cism of the aspirational approach is that it is fundamentally inconsis-
tent with democratic rule." 5 This criticism basically argues that the
judge will often substitute his own judgment for what the people think
under the guise that his judgment is what the people should think, and
therefore acts in a anti-democratic or paternalistic manner." 6 The
next two sections refute these criticisms in turn.
2. Why Aspirational Principles Fit the Institutional Role of Judges
in a Constitutional Democracy
As stated above, some commentators criticize an aspirational read-
ing of the Clause on the grounds that it allows courts to place new
restrictions upon democratic rule." 7 Thus, the judiciary is placed in
an institutional position that actually impedes democratic governance.
This is not the case, however, when one considers that our govern-
ment is a constitutional democracy; the purpose of having a written
constitution is to constrain the power of majorities when democratic
outcomes infringe upon the higher law of the Constitution." s Thus,
when courts act contrary to the will of the majority and defend the
higher law of the Constitution, they are acting in the role envisioned
for them by the Framers." 9 Accordingly, any criticism of this practice
112. 1& at 373.
113. See Scalia, Interpretation, supra note 85, at 41-44.
114. Id
115. See Bork, supra note 85, at 252-53; Scalia, Interpretation, supra note 85, at 9-10
(discussing the uncomfortable relationship of common law courts and democratic
rule).
116. See Scalia, Interpretation, supra note 85, at 9-14.
117. See supra notes 115-16 and accompanying text.
118. Bickel, supra note 9, at 16; Federalist No. 78, supra note 80, at 467 (stating that
the Constitution ought to be preferred over a statute when the two conflict).
119. See Federalist No. 78, supra note 80, at 469 (calling judges the "bulwarks of a
limited Constitution"); Bickel, supra note 9. at 16.
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is really an argument against constitutional democracy itself, not an
argument against the aspirational reading of the text.
The positive approach advocated by Justice Powell and Chief Jus-
tice Burger, an attempt to reconcile judicial review with democratic
governance, is also inconsistent with the institutional role of judges in
our system,120 primarily because the judiciary will not protect the
higher law of the Constitution from outcomes which contravene it.121
Reliance upon public opinion to determine constitutionality effec-
tively reads the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause out of the
Constitution by conferring constitutionality upon any legislative en-
actments by mere virtue of their popular endorsement.'22 One pur-
pose of the Constitution is to limit the actions of the majority, but
those advocating Justice Powell's approach would look specifically to
majorities to determine the parameters of constitutionality, thereby
eliminating the role of the Constitution as a check on majorities. 123
The shortcomings of both the positive and originalist positions high-
light the fact that the Clause must be filled with conceptions of cruelty
that are consistent with the purpose of a constitutional democracy-to
place limits on what popularly elected majorities can do.2 4 A source
of content based on aspirational principles embodied in the Constitu-
tion would fulfill the purpose of the Clause, which is to insulate soci-
ety "from our baser selves" by protecting individuals from the
occasional collective temptation to be cruel. 125
The question of whether a punishment is cruel and unusual should
depend on whether people who were fully informed as to the purposes
of the punishment and its potential drawbacks would find the penalty
unacceptable on the whole. 126 While there are good justifications for
120. See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 436-40 (1972) (Powell, J., dissent-
ing); id. at 385-88 (Burger, CJ., dissenting); see supra part II.B.3.b.
121. See, e.g., Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 102 (1958) (invalidating legislature's pun-
ishment of expatriation for certain criminal offenses); Weems v. United States, 217
U.S. 349, 382 (1910) (proscribing Philippine punishment of cadena temporal);
Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 128 (1810) (Marshall, C.J.) (explaining the
sensitive function of the judiciary in reviewing legislative enactments for constitution-
ality); Dworkin, supra note 86, at 122-23; Ely, supra note 86, at 73-104; Radin, supra
note 66, at 1034-36.
122. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 263 (Brennan, J., concurring) (arguing that a primary
purpose of the Bill of Rights was to check the power of the legislature); see also
Dworkin, supra note 101, at 191-92 (suggesting that certain rights must be placed
outside the reach of majorities because they are preconditions to proper democratic
functioning); Fleming, supra note 86, at 217-18 (explaining the role of the Constitu-
tion in securing fundamental rights as preconditions of deliberative democracy); Ra-
din, supra note 66, at 1035-36 (arguing that it is improper to rely on opinion polls in
constitutional adjudication).
123. See supra note 120-22.
124. See supra note 118-22 and accompanying text.
125. Furman, 408 U.S. at 345 (Marshall, J., concurring); see Dworkin, supra note 86,
at 122-23; Radin, supra note 66, at 1035-36.
126. Furman, 408 U.S. at 361 (Marshall, J., concurring); Radin, supra note 66, at
1039.
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this idea, it too is criticized on the grounds that judges are allowed to
substitute their own opinions of what people should think for what
they actually do think, and therefore are acting in an anti-democratic
manner.
127
3. The Aspirational Reading Is Not Anti-Democratic
Two arguments refute the contention that judges act anti-democrat-
ically when they invalidate popular outcomes. First, Professor Dwor-
kin argues that the Constitution is a constitution of abstract principles
that sets forth general, yet comprehensive, moral standards.128 If the
Constitution is read as a compilation of the people's aspirational prin-
ciples, then the role of judges is to identify these deeper abstract
moral principles' 29 and determine whether the ordinary laws are con-
sistent.130 When conceived in this manner, the role of judges is demo-
cratic because they serve to protect the people's higher law from
encroachments of ordinary law.13 1
127. John Hart Ely has written that gleaning the content of the Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Clause from consensus is vulnerable to being directly contradicted by
subsequent legislative enactments. Ely, supra note 86, at 65, 173-74. As an example of
the dangers of the consensus approach, he points to Justices Brennan and Marshall's
concurring opinions in Furman, in which they stated their beliefs that capital punish-
ment is unconstitutional because it is out of accord with society's values. Stated dif-
ferently, Justices Brennan and Marshall expressed their belief that the Constitution
embodies an aspirational principle inidcating that, at this point in our history, capital
punishment is unconstitutional. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 279 (Brennan, J., concurring)
(stating that legislative authorization of a punishment does not establish acceptance of
the punishment); id at 361 (Marshall, J., concurring) (stating that, in determining
whether a punishment is cruel, public opinion is of limited utility, and that the deter-
mination really depends on whether "people who were fully informed as to the pur-
poses of the penalty and its liabilities would find the penalty shocking, unjust, and
unacceptable"). Shortly after the Supreme Court issued its judgment in Furman,
however, Ely pointed out that the "virtual stampede" of reenactments of the death
penalty sharply rebuked the belief that capital punishment was not in accord with
society's values. Ld. But the validity of Ely's criticism depends upon how one defines
"consensus." If one accepts the proposition, advocated by those such as Justice Pow-
ell, that consensus is found in legislation and public opinion polls, then Ely's criticism
is exactly right. Justices Brennan and Marshall look to higher aspirational principles
when determining consensus. Ely's criticism is not germane to the aspirational model
because according this model, legislation is valid only when it is in accord with the
Constitution's higher aspirational principles. See Dworkin, supra note 86, at 135-38
(arguing that the Constitution is a constitution of comprehensive aspirational princi-
ples). Justices Brennan and Marshall would argue that capital punishment statutes
are inconsistent with the higher aspirational principles of the Constitution, and thus
the numerous capital punishment statutes passed after Furman are not proper indica-
tors of the constitutionality of capital punishment. See also supra notes 118-22 and
accompanying text.
128. See Dworkin, supra note 86, at 119-25.
129. Id
130. Id; see supra part III.A.2 (discussing the judge's role in protecting the higher
law of the Constitution from the encroachments of legislative enactments).
131. Bickel, supra note 9, at 16; Federalist No. 78, supra note 80, at 467-69.
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The second reason the aspirational reading is not anti-democratic is
based on the concept of reflective equilibrium, the process by which
we conform our individual decisions to the general principles in which
we believe. 3 ' The approach advocated by Justices Brennan and Mar-
shall assumes that the populace is rational enough to conform its
views to the realities of the penalty in question.133 Assuming that the
populace's decisions can be made according to the available informa-
tion, the judge must require a certain minimum rationality on the part
of the populace before its views can be taken seriously."3 Conse-
quently, a court should be influenced by the moral consensus of the
populace only when that judgment can be inferred as part of a coher-
ent moral position for each person who believes it.' 35 This reflective
equilibrium is reached after each moral position is measured against
the person's deeply held convictions to assure consistency.' 6 Because
no public opinion poll exists that can ensure reflective equilibrium, the
judge must seek to discern society's deeply held values and compare
these values to the punishment in question.' 37
The two arguments mentioned above are closely related. The pub-
lic's position on an issue will hopefully reflect an underlying societal
consensus. Principles upon which there is clear societal consensus can
be the same aspirational principles embodied in the Constitution.
When the two are in disagreement, however, the higher aspirational
principles of the Constitution govern. 38 This relationship can be bet-
ter demonstrated by example. Suppose the legislature passed a mea-
sure allowing the police to perform random searches of convicted
drug dealers' homes to assure that the former convicts were acting
lawfully. Such a law may be said to represent the consensus of the
majority, but is inconsistent with the Constitution's deeply rooted as-
pirational principle of freedom from government intrusion in the
home as embodied in the Fourth Amendment. 39 The judge would be
correct in invalidating the statute due to its inconsistency with soci-
ety's deeply held aspirational principle that privacy is a fundamental
132. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 48-51 (1971) (describing reflective equilib-
rium); see Dworkin, supra note 101, at 248-53 (describing the same basic concept in
terms of a moral position); Radin, supra note 66, at 1041.
133. See Rawls, supra note 132, at 48; Radin, supra note 66, at 1041.
134. Radin, supra note 66, at 1040-41.
135. Id1
136. Id.
137. Id at 1041-42. For an example of a judge discerning underlying consensus, see
Justice Brennan's concurrence in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 257-306 (1972).
138. See Bickel, supra note 9, at 16 (explaining that when there is conflict between
the Constitution and ordinary law, the Constitution governs); Dworkin, supra note 86,
at 137 (stating that the Constitution was designed to lay out aspirational principles of
government).
139. See Poe v. Ullman 367 U.S. 497, 548-51 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (explain-
ing that the Fourth Amendment's role is to protect the home from government intru-
sion absent compelling justification).
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liberty." The judge could not take the popular view seriously in this
case because it is not internally consistent with our fundamental polit-
ical beliefs. Thus, aspirational principles will often be the yardstick by
which we measure the internal consistency of the populace's opinions.
This Note now seeks to discern those underlying aspirational princi-
ples to guide the inquiry into whether a given punishment, in this case
chemical castration, is cruel.
B. Determining Our Underlying Values in the Context of
Chemical Castration
How do we determine our underlying principles? Because no pub-
lic opinion poll can perfectly determine the public's reaction to spe-
cific punishments, judges must use concepts upon which there is a
consensus to infer what a coherent position would be with respect to
the particular punishment.14 ' Justice Brennan, in his Furman concur-
rence, suggested several principles to guide a judge in determining
whether a given punishment is cruel. 142
1. The Gratuitous Infliction of Suffering
One principle that Justice Brennan identified is whether a given
punishment amounts to the gratuitous infliction of suffering.143 If
there is no justifiable reason for inflicting suffering, then there can be
little doubt that the method in question is cruel,1  because a measure
that neither protects society from future crimes, nor rehabilitates the
perpetrator is purposeless punishment. 145 The California Statute will
not serve to rehabilitate the offender because it disregards well ac-
cepted medical distinctions between classes of sexual offenders, and
instead groups all sexual offenders into an amorphous collection.
146
Additionally, the law requires that all sex offenders undergo a treat-
ment that has been shown to have only arguable success with one dis-
140. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973) (holding Texas' abortion statute
unconstitutional because it was inconsistent with the fundamental right to privacy).
141. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 271-74 (Brennan, J., concurring) (discerning society's
underlying values and comparing them to the punishment in question to determine
constitutionality); Radin, supra note 66, at 1042-47.
142. Furman, 408 U.S. at 271-79. Justice Brennan also discussed proportionality
and excessiveness as criteria to guide a judge. Id. This Note, however, does not utilize
these two inquiries because they raise the question of whether the Clause contains a
proportionality requirement. Rather, this Note focuses on whether castration is cruel,
not on whether it is proportional. See supra part II.B.1.
143. Furman, 408 U.S. at 280 (Brennan, J., concurring).
144. Id.; Radin, supra note 66, at 1043.
145. Furman, 408 U.S. at 280-82 (Brennan, J., concurring). Another objective of
punishment is retribution. The Eighth Amendment limits the extent to which society
may punish; punishment may not be cruel. Thus, arguing that retribution is a suffi-
cient basis to justify chemical castration assumes what must be proven through good
argument, i.e., that chemical castration is not cruel
146. See supra part I (explaining that Depo-Provera research was done only with
paraphiliac offenders, and not with other recognized classes of sexual offenders).
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tinct class of offenders.' 47 Furthermore, the one class of offenders
who arguably have been responsive to the drug have shown this im-
provement only when the drug is administered in conjunction with
counseling." Because the California Statute does not provide for
such counseling, Depo-Provera will not be effective in treating any
offenders, and, as a result, paroled offenders will likely present a sub-
stantial risk to society.'49 The law does not offer the promise of effec-
tive rehabilitation and worst of all leaves innocent persons at risk of
future attacks. From a public safety perspective, continued imprison-
ment of sexual offenders is much more desirable then the ineffective
regime created by the California Statute. Therefore, because chemical
castration is ineffective and cruel, a judge could conclude that it vio-
lates the people's higher law against gratuitous punishment.
2. The Denial of Human Dignity
The deprivation of rights without good reason brings into focus an-
other underlying theme of cruel punishment. A cruel act violates the
collective dignity of both the individual and society.'5 0 The notion
that a punishment must not violate human dignity is based on the
moral obligation to treat other people with the kind of respect that
must be accorded all persons because of their humanity;15 1 violations
of respect and dignity are manifested by deprivations of fundamental
rights.'52 California's eradication of basic fundamental rights, ac-
corded a person because he is human, such as the right to procreate, 153
the right to decisional autonomy,154 and the right to privacy, 55
amounts to a denial of that person's dignity as a human being. The
fact that sex offenders commit vile crimes does not give the legislature
147. See supra part I.B.
148. See supra part I.B.
149. See supra part I.C.
150. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 270-73 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring) (ar-
guing that the import of many of the Court's cruelty cases is that "even the vilest
criminal remains a human being possessed of common human dignity"); cf. Robinson
v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666-67 (1962) (holding that the state is not permitted to
treat disease as a crime because "[elven one day in prison would be a cruel and unu-
sual punishment for the 'crime' of having a common cold"); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S.
86, 101 (1958) (explaining that expatriation amounts to denial by society of the indi-
vidual's membership in a human community); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349,
366 (1910) (stating that the punishment of cadena temporal, the binding of hands and
ankles in chains, followed by the loss of all civil rights, is completely degrading); see
also Radin, supra note 66, at 1043. Professor Dworkin uses language of "equal con-
cern and respect" when referring to the requirement that all persons be treated with
dignity. See Dworkin, supra note 101, at 180.
151. See supra note 150.
152. Cf. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101-02 (1958) (holding the punishment of de-
nationalization inhumane and cruel because it involves the loss of the right to have
rights).
153. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
154. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 857 (1992).
155. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
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authority to treat them inhumanely. The purpose of the Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Clause is to ensure that under these tempting
circumstances "even the vilest criminal remains a human being pos-
sessed of common human dignity."'1 5 6 The elimination of these funda-
mental rights is especially unjustifiable when California has no
argument that these measures will further any legitimate state goal.15
Analysis of the above factors indicates the infirmity of the Califor-
nia Statute. It violates the principles against undignified and inhu-
mane treatment embodied by the Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Clause and hence should be found unconstitutional. Part IV utilizes
risk of error analysis to further demonstrate the infirmity of the Cali-
fornia Statute to those judges who believe that mistake-free applica-
tion of the California Statute would not violate the Eighth
Amendment. Part IV argues that, despite their rejection of the aspira-
tionalist reading, these judges should still find the law unconstitutional
because error in the application of the law poses too great a threat to
society's other aspirational principles. In demonstrating that a judge
must account for error in the application of any legal rule-here the
mandatory imposition of chemical castration-part IV shows that
even opponents of the aspirationalist reading must conclude that the
California Statute is unacceptable.
IV. RISK OF ERROR AND JUDICIAL DISCRETION
Even if one accepts that the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause
should be read to embody aspirational principles, the inevitability of
error in human institutions will often lead to mistakes in application of
these principles, and these errors could, in turn, sacrifice other core
aspirational values. This part presents an argument developed by Pro-
fessor Radin in the capital punishment context that gives criteria by
which judges can choose the preferred error in light of the reality that
legal rules will inevitably be applied incorrectly.
A. The Necessity of Risk of Error Analysis
This Note has argued that the proper way to define the Cruel and
Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment is by refer-
ence to aspirational principles15 8 that the higher law of the Constitu-
tion embodies. 159 Thus, a judge determining the validity of a
particular enactment with no specific guidance from an open provision
of the Constitution must look to these aspirational principles to deter-
mine the validity of the law. Professor Radin has forcefully argued,
however, that the fallibility of human institutions makes it likely that
156. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 273 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring).
157. See supra notes 146-49 and accompanying text.
158. See supra part III.A.
159. See supra part lII.A.
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these principles will be compromised by error in application.160 For
example, in ideal terms we know that it is wrong to murder. But
human error in applying the rule against murder makes it likely that
this rule, manifested in convicting and punishing offenders, will com-
pete with another important value that it is wrong to imprison an in-
nocent person.161 Human error could lead a judge who correctly
identifies the principle that murder is wrong to the wrong result.
How? The judge could say that because we so cherish human life,
society must put the burden of proof on the accused. If our law en-
forcement mechanisms were perfect, such an approach would be justi-
fied; the allocation of the burden would be inconsequential. Such a
holding, however, fails to recognize that law enforcement agencies
could apprehend the wrong person. The inability to recognize human
fallibility would lead to society's infringing another core value-that it
is wrong to imprison an innocent person. Risk of error thus serves to
adjust society's competing values in light of the recognition that our
laws, as principled as they may be in theory, are likely to be errone-
ously applied in practice. 62 Accordingly, to justify any law it is also
necessary to account for error so as to maintain fidelity to all of soci-
ety's values.' 63 In the context of interpreting the Constitution, then, it
is necessary not only to evaluate whether the law, in theory, is consis-
tent with the Constitution; it is also necessary to determine whether
society can accept the consequences that will follow from the inevita-
ble error that will occur when the law is applied in practice."6 In this
fashion, risk of error analysis is the critical last step that judges must
take to adjust and prioritize society's underlying principles in light of
uncertainty and error in application, 65 and courts have taken account
of risk of error in a variety of criminal and non-criminal cases.
Consideration of risk of error is particularly relevant in the criminal
context. One example is the criminal guilt standard requiring proof
beyond a reasonable doubt. A system without proof standards could
work in theory-but we all know that errors would occur, and the
consequences would be severe. Hence this standard exemplifies soci-
ety's belief, in light of inevitable error, that it is better to let a guilty
person go free than to convict an innocent person. 66 Related is the
160. Margaret Jane Radin, Risk-of-Error Rules and Non-Ideal Justification, in Justi-
fication 33, 34 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1986) (Nomos XXVIII)
[hereinafter Radin, Justification]; Radin, supra note 66, at 1017.
161. See Radin, Justification, supra note 160, at 37.
162. Radin points out that the reality of error calls into question the usefulness in
practice of rules that are developed in the errorless ideal world, because the certainty
of error undermines their justness. Id.
163. Id. at 34.
164. Id at 39.
165. Id at 34.
166. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 369-72 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) (stating that
standards of proof represent the confidence that we require to find a person guilty);
Barbara D. Underwood, The Thumb on the Scales of Justice: Burdens of Persuasion
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presumption that an accused is innocent until proven guilty.' 67 These
standards reflect society's view that the government must be put to
the test of proving the person's guilt before being able to deprive him
of his liberty.168
Similarly, the exclusionary rule in evidence is based upon the im-
portance of the right of privacy in the home as embodied in the Fourth
Amendment.169 A judge made rule, the exclusionary rule reflects the
reality that a judge may be called upon to create a preferred risk of
error to fully comply with the spirit of the constitutional text. Thus, if
the police violate the sanctity of the home as embodied in the Fourth
Amendment without showing cause before a neutral magistrate, they
will be punished by not being able to introduce the evidence obtained
from the illegal search.170 The rule reflects the judgment that we want
the police to intrude upon the privacy of the home only when there is
probable cause to do so, and that we will tolerate some loss of police
efficiency as a result. 71
in Criminal Cases, 86 Yale LJ. 1299, 1331-38 (1977) (explaining the policies served by
evidentiary burdens); see also John Kaplan, Decision Theory and the Facoinding Pro-
cess, 20 Stan. L. Rev. 1065, 1071-77 (1968) (noting that the choice of standard of proof
in a case reflects a judgment of the comparable social costs of erroneous
determinations).
167. See, e.g., Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 494 (1972) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the standard of requiring guilt beyond a reasonable doubt provides sub-
stance for the presumption of innocence); cf. Harry T. Edwards, To Err Is Human,
But Not Always Harmless: When Should Legal Error Be Tolerated?, 70 N.Y.U. L
Rev. 1167, 1173 (1995) (arguing that in criminal appeals, judges should attempt to
determine the overall effect on the verdict that error may have had in order to pre-
serve the fundamental individual liberties at stake).
168. For a general discussion of the role that evidentiary burdens play in the courts,
see George P. Fletcher, Two Kinds of Legal Rules: A Comparative Study of Burden-
of-Persuasion Practices in Criminal Cases, 77 Yale LJ. 880, 894 (1968) (stating that
burdens of persuasion function to adjust the interests of competing classes of
litigants).
169. The Fourth Amendment provides that, "[t]he right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized." U.S. Const. amend. IV. See also
Donald L. Doemberg, "The Right of the People": Reconciling Collective and Individ-
ual Interests Under the Fourth Amendment, 58 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 259, 260 (1983) (stating
that one of the Fourth Amendment's purposes is to protect the personal privacy rights
of individuals).
170. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914) (holding that letters obtained
by a United States official without a warrant were not admissible as evidence because
they were obtained in violation of the defendants' constitutional rights).
171. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 584-90 (1980) (protecting the home and
the privacy of the individual from search absent a magistrate's finding of probable
cause); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978) (holding that society protects the
expectation of privacy in the home); William J. Stuntz, Warrants and Fourth Amend-
ment Remedies, 77 Va. L. Rev. 881, 924-25 (1991) (explaining that the privacy of the
home protected by the probable cause warrant requirement); see also Margaret Jane
Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 Stan. L. Rev. 957, 1001-02, (1982) (discussing risk
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The risk of error principle manifests itself in other areas of the law
as well. In Roe v. Wade,172 the Court stated that there was no answer
to the question of whether the fetus was a person in the constitutional
sense. 173 In light of this uncertainty, the Court argued that it was bet-
ter to vindicate the right of the mother to choose whether to carry the
fetus to term. 74 In Cruzan v. Missouri Department of Health,75 the
Court argued that it was better to leave Nancy Cruzan, a young wo-
man in a permanent vegetative state, on life support in light of the
uncertainty surrounding her wishes concerning the subject. The Court
stated that it was preferable to err on the side of preserving life as
compared to turning off the life support because if the Court was
wrong, the latter choice would constitute irreversible error.176
In all of these cases, it would be preferable, of course, to have per-
fect application of the rule; for instance, one that would send all the
guilty to jail and set all of the innocent free. But because perfect en-
forcement is not possible, judges select a preferred error which re-
flects a decision about which interests society values as most
compelling. 177
B. Factors Examined in Allocating Error
Recognizing that the inevitability of error will often cause society's
core values to conflict highlights the need to have a principled means
of determining which interests should be vindicated in anticipation of
the inevitability of error. In the context of chemical castration, the
reality of error places the liberty interest of the individual against
those interests asserted by the state. Professor Radin has argued that
courts should look to the factors discussed below to guide the inquiry
as to whether deference to individual rights or state interests is appro-
priate in a particular case. These factors will, in other words, deter-
mine the preferred risk of error and in so doing determine whether
deference to the legislature's actions is appropriate. This section pro-
ceeds by evaluating chemical castration in light of these factors, con-
cluding that in determining its constitutionality under the Eighth
Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, courts should
of error in the context of the Fourth Amendment's protection of "houses, papers, and
effects").
172. 410 U.S. 113 (1973)
173. See id. at 159-60 (stating that the Court need not resolve the question of
whether the fetus was alive).
174. See id. at 162-66 (holding that the state could not choose to err against the
rights of the pregnant woman in the absence of consensus that the fetus was a full
person).
175. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
176. Ia at 283 (arguing that it is preferable to leave the patient on life support
rather than remove her because the latter action would, if wrong, constitute irrevers-
ible error).
177. Radin, supra note 66, at 1024-25.
[Vol. 652638
CALIFORNIA CASTRATION
err on the side of protecting fundamental rights. This leads to the
conclusion that chemical castration should be barred as a mandatory
condition of probation.
1. Is the Punishment Irrevocable?
17 8
When a punishment or a deprivation of rights is irrevocable, a
court's mistaken punishment or deprivation of rights cannot be re-
versed. As a result, Professor Radin argues, decisions that are irrevo-
cable cause courts to more stringently scrutinize the corresponding
irrevocable deprivation of rights.179 For example, in Skinner v.
Oklahoma,"s the Court alluded to the irrevocability of sterilization as
the reason why the Court had to closely scrutinize it. The Court
stated that "[t]here is no redemption for the individual whom the law
touches. Any experiment which the State conducts is to his irrepara-
ble injury."'181 The Cruzan Court"m also stressed that the decision to
turn off life support, if incorrect, would be irrevocable.8s3
Although chemical castration is not an irrevocable procedure in a
physical sense, there are two ways in which one could argue that the
procedure is, in fact, irrevocable. First, making repeat sex offenders
submit to a lengthy cycle of Depo-Provera administration may argua-
bly have long-term side effects." u Although no research has been
done on the exact long-term adverse health effects of Depo-Provera,
there is considerable suspicion among some researchers who claim
that the short-term contraindications are serious enough to make
long-term use of the drug problematic."a These researchers' suspi-
cions provide a plausible basis to suggest that the continuous use of
the drug, which would be necessary to successfully suppress the sexual
178. Id. at 1022.
179. Il at 1024-25; Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (holding a state
law subject to stringent review because the state, if wrong, would do "irreparable
injury" to the individual); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423-24 (1979) (stating
that the graver the deprivation of rights, the more the state bears the risk of error
upon itself); Cruzan v. Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261,283 (1990) (stating that
"[t]he more stringent the burden of proof a party must bear, the more that party bears
the risk of an erroneous decision").
180. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
181. Id. at 541.
182. See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
183. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 283.
184. Green, supra note 18, at 7 (pointing out that Depo-Provera causes cancer in
laboratory animals); Melella, supra note 50, at 225 (stating that studies have shown
that the drug causes breast cancer in female dogs and uterine cancer in monkeys);
Stone, supra note 51, at 1754 (discussing uncertainty surrounding the potential long-
term adverse health effects of Depo-Provera, including cancer and osteoporosis);
Vanderzyl, supra note 28, at 117-18; PDR, supra note 10, at 2082 (indicating potential
side effects of Depo-Provera).
185. See Melella, supra note 50, at 225; Stone, supra note 51, at 1754.
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drive of the offender, poses adverse health consequences that could
prove irreversible.8 6
There is a second way in which the use of Depo-Provera could be
deemed irreversible. The defendant is deprived of his fundamental
procreative rights during the period in which he undergoes the injec-
tions.187 Administered to women, a possibility that the California
Statute countenances, 188 Depo-Provera definitely eliminates procrea-
tive ability because the primary indication of Depo-Provera is as a
female contraceptive. 89 There is debate, however, about whether the
drug eliminates the procreative ability of men. Indeed, some medical
and legal commentators have stressed that those undergoing the treat-
ment suffer no decrease in consensual sexual activity, and that the re-
cipient of Depo-Provera only suffers erotic apathy. 190 Other
commentators, however, have argued that Depo-Provera does effec-
tively eliminate procreative ability.' 91 This Note submits that there is
a high likelihood that the procreative liberty of the male offender is
eliminated for two related reasons. First, there is a consensus that
Depo-Provera lowers testosterone levels by reducing its prevalence in
the bloodstream and limiting its production; this is the very purpose of
using the drug on sexual offenders. 9 It is therefore absurd to argue
that a drug, that specifically seeks to decrease a man's sexual drive,
could not in fact limit that drive.' 93 Second, because Depo-Provera
must be administered continuously to be effective, commentators
point out that the net effect of the drug is that it effectively eliminates
procreative ability.'94 Accordingly, the California Statute will un-
doubtedly eliminate the procreative liberty of women offenders, and
should be expected to do the same in male offenders.
186. See supra note 15; Stone, supra note 51, at 1754.
187. See Melella, supra note 50, at 225; Green, supra note 18, at 24; Hicks, supra
note 12, at 661; Vanderzyl, supra note 28, at 122.
188. The California Statute is written to apply to all offenders guilty of repeat sex-
ual offenses; insofar as a woman commits two sexual offenses, she is subject to the
law. Cal. Penal Code § 645 (West Supp. 1997); see Senate Rules Committee Hearings,
supra note 28, at 8 (explaining that as written the statute applies to women as well as
men).
189. PDR, supra note 10, at 2079-81.
190. Walker, supra note 11, at 435; Fitzgerald, supra note 2, at 7.
191. Melella, supra note 50, at 228 (noting that administration of Depo-Provera
probably prevents recipients from fathering a child); Green, supra note 18, at 24;
Hicks, supra note 28, at 122; Money, supra note 18, at 168.
192. See supra notes 11-14 and accompanying text.
193. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
194. Melella, supra note 50, at 225 (recipient of Depo-Provera could probably not
father a child); see also Green, supra note 18, at 24 (arguing that Depo-Provera elimi-
nates a man's ability to procreate); Hicks, supra note 12, at 646 (stating that Depo-
Provera causes temporary impotence); Money, supra note 18, at 168 (stating that
Depo-Provera induces erotic apathy and thereby eliminates any behavior "requiring
an erect penis").
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Many proponents of chemical castration have argued in response
that the elimination of procreative liberty in question is not really
problematic because the deprivation is temporary and reversible. 195
Two arguments suggest this contention is ill considered.
First, the deprivation of a fundamental liberty should not be taken
lightly simply because it presumably can be undone." The erroneous
deprivation of procreative rights can be analogized to the wrongful
deprivation of liberty during mistaken imprisonment. If the justice
system convicts wrongly, and sends an innocent person to prison, the
loss of freedom for the period of imprisonment is irrevocable, even
though the person could ultimately be released. This is why the Court
has interpreted the Constitution to mandate proof of guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt before the state can imprison someone.'9 Chemical
castration is irrevocable in the same way because the loss of procrea-
tive rights is irreversible for the time that the drug is given, even
though the treatment could ultimately be terminated.198 Thus, the
fact that the deprivation of the fundamental right in question can be
undone does not mean that the law does not take that deprivation
seriously.
Second, the context of the California statute negates the argument
that chemical castration is fully reversible. In order to be effective,
Depo-Provera must be continually administered to the offender. 99
The only way that a proponent of the California law could argue that
reversibility is significant is by contending that the offender could be
withdrawn from the medication.' ° Arguing in this manner, however,
undermines the purpose and the effectiveness of the California Stat-
ute.210 So, while chemical castration is a reversible procedure, the
context of the California Statute diminishes the force of this
distinction.
195. See, eg., Fitzgerald, supra note 2, at 6 (stating that all effects of the drug cease
with suspension of treatment); Melella, supra note 50, at 225 (stating that effects are
temporary and reversible).
196. See Margaret J. Radin, Cruel Punishment & Respect for Persons: Super Due
Process for Death, 53 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1143, 1162 (1980) (arguing that the fact that the
effects of a punishment can be undone does not make the original deprivation any less
unjust).
197. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 362 (1970) (explaining that a higher standard of
proof of guilt is needed to protect individual rights).
198. Melella, supra note 50, at 225 (stating that Depo-Provera deprives the offender
of reproductive freedom); Vanderzyl, supra note 28, at 122-
199. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
200. The California Statute provides that the offender will be given Depo-Provera
until he no longer poses a threat. Because the law, as written, will not result in reha-
bilitating any offenders, the administrants will arguably never cease to be a threat to
society. See supra notes 16-41 and accompanying text. Thus, the most likely result of
the California Statute is that recipients will be administered Depo-Provera
indefinitely.
201. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text (discussing the legislative history
of § 645).
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2. Is the Punishment Severe?
Professor Radin points out that courts also consider the severity of
a punishment.202 Severity is a measure of the strength of the individ-
ual interest it inflicts, which in turn is measured by the extent of the
pain or suffering involved, and the question of whether the punish-
ment implicates a fundamental right.20 3 The more severe the punish-
ment, the more extensive the deprivation of liberty.2°4 The California
Statute implicates several fundamental constitutional rights. This
Note has already established that chemical castration infringes upon
the right to procreate because the offender's ability to reproduce has
been effectively eliminated;2 0 5 it violates the offender's right to pri-
vacy20 6 because the state has thrust itself into procreative decisions;
and it violates the offender's right to refuse medical treatment because
he has no choice but to accept the treatment.2 07 Because it impinges
on such fundamental rights, the California Statute is a severe punish-
ment and merits close judicial scrutiny. Courts typically undertake
such close scrutiny whenever fundamental rights are jeopardized by
the state.20 8
202. Radin, supra note 66, at 1025.
203. Id; Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 271-73 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring)
(explaining the nature of severe punishments); Vanderzyl, supra note 28, at 129.
204. See Radin, supra note 66, at 1026; cf. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101-02 (1958)
(noting that expatriation is the most severe punishment because it involves the loss of
the right to have rights).
205. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942); Melella, supra note 50, at 226-
27; Vanderzyl, supra note 28, at 121-24; see supra notes 189-94 and accompanying text.
206. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973); Melella, supra note 50, at 226;
Vanderzyl, supra note 28, at 118-21.
207. Cruzan v. Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990); Melella, supra
note 50, at 226; Vanderzyl, supra note 28, at 124-26. It is possible to argue that the
opportunity to refuse parole provides a choice for the offender. See Kenneth B. From-
son, Beyond an Eye for an Eye: Castration as an Alternative Sentencing Measure, 11
N.Y.L. Sch. J. Hum. Rts. 311, 332-33 (1994). This Note submits, however, that the
alternative to accepting the treatment, remaining in prison, is coercive, and therefore
does not give the opportunity for free choice. See United States v. Pierce, 561 F.2d
735, 739 (9th Cir. 1977) (stating that the defendant's consent to a probation condition
is "likely to be nominal where consent is given only to avoid imprisonment"); Jeffrey
N. Hurwitz, House Arrest: A Critical Analysis of an Intermediate-Level Penal Sanc-
tion, 135 U. Pa. L. Rev. 771, 795 (1987).
208. See Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541; Roe, 410 U.S. at 153; see also Cruzan, 497 U.S. at
278 (holding that the patient has right to refuse medical treatment); Furman v. Geor-
gia, 408 U.S. 238, 286-88 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring) (stating that the more se-
vere a punishment is, the stricter the review that the Court should apply); cf. Trop,
356 U.S. at 101-02 (scrutinizing the punishment of expatriation because it denies the
right to have rights).
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3. Has the Punishment Been Traditionally Sanctioned?
Another factor that Professor Radin identified is whether the pun-
ishment has been traditionally sanctioned.2°9 There is no historical
precedent for chemical castration because it is a relatively new proce-
dure.21 0 Chemical castration can, however, be analogized to surgical
castration,211 the punishment that it replaces in the California penal
code.21 2 In order to analogize chemical castration to surgical castra-
tion, it is necessary to first discern what is unacceptable about tradi-
tional castration. There are two possibilities, each examined below.
The first possible reason that surgical castration has been pro-
scribed is because it constitutes an impermissible restriction of the
rights of bodily integrity and procreative freedom. 21 3 Thus, any pun-
ishment like surgical castration that infringes on fundamental liberties
such as bodily integrity and procreative freedom is subject to the
Supreme Court's most stringent scrutiny.214 If one accepts this ac-
count of why surgical castration is historically proscribed, then chemi-
cal castration must also be proscribed as an impermissible
infringement upon the fundamental rights to bodily integrity and pro-
creative freedom. 21 -5 The forced administration of the drug violates
the right to bodily integrity.216 Additionally, the right to procreative
freedom is also violated when people are forcibly injected with a drug
that eliminates reproductive ability.217
209. Radin, supra note 66, at 1028-29; see also Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957,
979-85 (1991) (Scalia, J.) (stating that the Clause was intended to prohibit punish-
ments that were historically proscribed).
210. See supra note 18 and accompanying text (discussing early Depo-Provera
research).
211. See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 377 (1910) (characterizing as cruel
various types of physical alteration, such as castration). Many commentators have
concluded that the word "unusual" in the Clause refers to those punishments that
were traditionally illegal, or unavailable, to judges as a means of punishment. Be-
cause American courts have not had access to castration as a punishment, castration is
"unusual" in that it has never been a legally available punishment in the United
States. See Anthony Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted". The
Original Meaning, 57 Cal. L. Rev. 839, 859 (1969).
212. See 1996 CA AB 3339 (repealing the law authorizing surgical castration and
instead providing that, upon parole, a judge may order a first time offender, and must
order a second time offender, to be chemically castrated, in addition to any other
punishments prescribed by law).
213. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990) (upholding
the individual's liberty interest in refusing unwanted treatment); see also Skinner v.
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (prohibiting the use of compulsory vasectomies as
criminal punishment, on the grounds that such a punishment violates the fundamental
rights component of equal protection).
214. See, e.g., Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541; Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
215. See supra notes 189-94 (arguing that Depo-Provera eliminates procreative
ability in men and women).
216. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 280 (upholding the right to refuse medical treatment).
217. See supra notes 189-94 and accompanying text (arguing that Depo-Provera
will eliminate the procreative ability of men and women).
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The second possible reason why surgical castration has been histori-
cally unacceptable is that it involves a degree of physical mutilation
and suffering that our society has simply found unacceptable.218 If
this is the reason that surgical castration has been traditionally prohib-
ited, then chemical castration should also be prohibited. While the
mutilation caused by physical castration is obvious, permanent, and
horrendous, chemical castration also causes unacceptable physical
mutilation because the continuous use of Depo-Provera entails many
frightening, adverse health effects."' These adverse effects include
testicular atrophy, deformed sperm, and diabetes mellitus, to name
just a few."2 The fact that chemical castration, like surgical castra-
tion, causes physical pain and mutilation, albeit in a more subtle form,
indicates that it merits the same legal treatment as surgical castration
and should thus be proscribed.
4. Does the Punishment Advance a Strong Government Interest?
In determining whether to err on the side of individual rights, courts
also consider the strength of the government's interest and its chosen
means.22 ' The strength of the government interest has two compo-
nents: the value of the government's goal, and the degree of certainty
that the means in question will further that goal. 2
The government's goal with respect to the chemical castration stat-
ute is to protect society from repeat offenders, and is obviously impor-
tant.m3 Recidivism rates for sexual offenses are incredibly high; the
average adolescent sex offender can be expected to commit an aston-
ishing 380 sex crimes.2 4 Society needs to be protected from such
criminals.
The method of punishment at issue, however, does not protect soci-
ety. The use of Depo-Provera on non-paraphiliac offenders has not
been shown effective in reducing recidivism among non-paraphiliac
offenders.725 Depo-Provera's effectiveness with paraphiliacs, further-
218. See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 366 (1910) (invalidating the use
cadena temporal because it entails great physical hardship); Harmelin v. Michigan,
501 U.S. 957, 981 (1991) (arguing that the purpose of the Clause was to prevent "hor-
rible tortures" such as maiming, mutilating and scourging to death).
219. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
220. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
221. Radin, supra note 66, at 1026-27.
222. l at 1027-28.
223. See infra note 224 (outlining the prevalence of the problem).
224. Riesenberg, supra note 12, at 900; see also A. Kenneth Fuller, Child Molesta-
tion and Pedophelia: An Overview for the Physician, 261 JAMA 602 (1989) (discuss-
ing the prevalence of child sex abuse); Hicks, supra note 12, at 664 (same); Vanderzyl,
supra note 28, at 138 (noting that 40% of sexual offenders will commit repeat of-
fenses); Sandra G. Boodman, Does Castration Stop Sex Crimes? An Old Punishment
Gains New Attention, But Experts Doubt Its Value, Wash. Post, Mar. 17, 1992, (Health
Magazine) at 7 (stating that 40% of sexual offenders will commit repeat crimes).
225. See supra part I.C (discussing that research has not been done with non-
paraphiliac offenders). It is also important to note that non-paraphiliac offenders
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more, depends on these offenders being offered counseling in conjunc-
tion with the use of Depo-Provera. 6 California's law fails to
recognize these two distinctions 27 It does not differentiate among
different types of sexual offenders, and it fails to offer psychological
counseling to those offenders who could be treated with Depo-
Provera3 - As a result, there is no evidence that the positive results
achieved when Depo-Provera was used in conjunction with counseling
on paraphiliacs will be realized in the vast majority of paroled sexual
offenders.2 9 Consequently, because Depo-Provera will be ineffective
as prescribed by the California Statute, there is a strong likelihood
that those punished with castration will continue to victimize society
once they are paroled. Thus, California cannot demonstrate that the
punishment in question furthers the goal of protecting society from
repeat sexual offenses. Under Professor Radin's analysis, then, this
factor weighs against judicial deference to the legislature and instead
favors a result that vindicates individual liberty.
These factors-that castration has been historically proscribed in
America, the loss of procreative rights, the serious adverse health con-
sequences that accompany long-term use, and the doubtful relation-
ship of the government's chosen means to the goals that can be
plausibly asserted-indicate that courts, after acknowledging the pos-
sibility of error in application, must forbid the state from mandating
chemical castration as a condition of parole, so as to avoid the possi-
bility of serious deprivations of constitutional rights.
compose a significant percentage of sex offenders. See Kee MacFarlane, Program
Considerations in the Treatment of Incest Offenders, in The Sexual Aggressor 62, 62-63
(Joanne G. Greer & Irving L Stuart eds., 1983) (stating that incest, a form of sexual
dysfunction distinguishable from a paraphilia, is a considerable and widespread prob-
lem); Stuart B. Silver & Michael K. Spodak, Forensic Mental Evaluation of the Violent
Sexual Offender, in The Sexual Aggressor 42, 42-58 (Joanne G. Greer & Irving R.
Stuart eds., 1983) (demonstrating the prevalence of violent sexual offenders, or Type
mII offenders, by giving a means of evaluating such offenders for the purposes of crim-
inal prosecution).
226. See supra part I.B.
227. In fact, the revised version of § 645 does not recognize any classes of offend-
ers. The law simply mandates that all repeat offenders without reference to category,
shall be chemically castrated upon parole, in addition to any other punishment pre-
scribed by law. See Cal. Penal Code § 645 (West Supp. 1997).
228. See Fitzgerald, supra note 2, at 5 (discussing the use of Depo-Provera after
comprehensive diagnosis and as part of a comprehensive treatment program).
229. Hicks, supra note 12, at 648, 665. Dr. Fred Berlin believes that the California
Statute will prove ineffective because it does not require an assessment of the partici-
pants, their willingness to be treated, or any other form of counseling that could end
their dysfunction. He stated, "I would never drop off someone once a week for a shot
[of Depo-Provera] and think that constitutes adequate treatment." Cohen, supra note
28, at 4; see also Douglas J. Besharov, Sex Offenders: Is Castration an Acceptable
Punishment?, 78 A.B.A. J., July 1992, at 42 (stating that "hormone treatment does not
work for anti-social personalities or for those whose sex offenses are motivated by
feelings of anger, violence, or power").
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CONCLUSION
The open language of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause
challenges us to find a source of content that is consistent with both
the text of the Clause and with the institutional role occupied by
judges. The aspirationalist reading meets this challenge by guarantee-
ing that the judiciary will act to protect human dignity from the inhu-
mane punishments that atrocious crimes engender. When the
Constitution is read in an aspirationalist fashion, the California Stat-
ute emerges as an impermissible and unconstitutional punishment.
Nonetheless, the aspirationalist reading of the Constitution in general,
and the Clause in particular, is fundamentally incomplete if one does
not account for error in the application of legal rules. Routinely un-
dertaken by courts in cases where the interests of the individual are
opposed to the state's, risk of error analysis-the essential last step
that a judge must take to prioritize society's values in light of error in
their application-conclusively demonstrates to judges of all interpre-
tational persuasions that the California Statute is unacceptable. In the
context of chemical castration, risk of error analysis demonstrates that
the preferred error is to protect individual liberties. Because Califor-
nia has chosen to err against individual liberties even though chemical
castration is severe, irreversible, ineffective, and arguably analogous
to a core case of cruelty, the California Statute must be invalidated.
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